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The Impact of Active Labor Market Programs on
the Duration of Unemployment in Switzerland
Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of Swiss active labor market programs on the job chances of
unemployed workers. The main innovation is a comparison of two important dynamic evalua-
tion estimators: the ”matching” estimator and the ”timing-of-events” estimator. Matching and
the simple proportional hazard estimator both work if job seekers are selected into programs
based on information that is observed but matching is preferable because it does not impose
proportionality of the hazard rate. Relying on proportionality, the timing-of-events estimator
identifies the causal effect of active labor market programs even when selection on observables
fails. We find that both estimators that assume selection on observables agree in finding that
temporary subsidized jobs shorten unemployment duration whereas training programs and em-
ployment programs do not. In contrast, the timing-of-events estimator suggests that none of
the Swiss active labor market programs can shorten unemployment duration.
Keywords: active labor market policy, treatment effect, multivariate duration model
JEL Classification: C14, C41, J64
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1 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to study the impact of active labor market policies (ALMPs)
on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. The new Swiss ALMPs reflect the increasing
consensus among policy makers that actively assisting the unemployed in job search is preferable
to simply providing them with passive income support. The danger is, so the argument goes,
that reliance on passive income support may reduce work incentives and job-search activities
and therefore increase the risk of long-term unemployment. ALMPs are seen by many as the
key to minimize these risks.
The question how participation in ALMP-measures affects labor market histories of individu-
als has been the subject of substantial debate. The main problem is that labor market outcomes
for participants may be systematically different from non-participants for reasons that are un-
observable to the researcher – the selection problem (see Heckman et al., 1999). In Switzerland,
like in most European countries, but unlike in the U.S., randomized social experiments are un-
common, so one has to deal with non-experimental data. In theory, several methods can be
used to estimate the treatment effects of ALMPs. Each of these methods deals with the selec-
tion problem under different assumptions. In the case of unemployment duration as variable
of interest two methods are particularly useful. The first one is the method of ‘matching ’, the
second one is the ‘timing-of-events’ method.
The main innovation of the present paper is a direct comparison between the timing-of-events
approach and the matching approach in estimating the effect of ALMPs on the rate by which
unemployed individuals find regular jobs. The method of matching is based on the conditional
independence assumption. If many variables that influence both labor market outcomes and
the selection process are observed, potential outcomes and selection are independent conditional
on the observables. The identifying assumption is that, after accounting for many observable
variables (including individual’s past labor market performance), no unobserved heterogeneity
correlated with potential outcomes and program participation is left. Among the many studies
that use the matching approach, the studies of Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Gerfin, Lech-
ner and Steiger (2005) are of interest here as they also evaluate the effect of Swiss ALMPs on
unemployment duration. Both studies find that employment programs perform very poorly,
vocational training programs show a rather mixed performance depending on the specific sub-
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program considered, whereas temporary subsidized jobs appears to be successful in terms of
increasing the chances on the labor market.1
The timing-of-events method allows for selection on unobservables in postulating a multivari-
ate mixed proportional hazard model in which both the inflow into an ALMP program and the
outflow from unemployment are specified and allowed to interact. The identifying assumption
is that these transition processes can be modelled as a multivariate mixed proportional hazard
(MMPH) model. The intuition is that, under this assumption, information on the correlations
between the unobserved heterogeneity components in the exit from unemployment and the en-
trance into ALMPs can be obtained from (i) the duration until the program starts and (ii) the
duration of unemployment. Because unobserved heterogeneity components are modelled explic-
itly, the treatment effect is estimated conditional on observed and unobserved variables taking
into account that the unobserved variables may influence both processes. The timing-of-events
method is a rather new approach and has been applied in only a few previous studies.2
In comparing the timing-of-events approach and the matching approach in estimating the
effect of ALMPs, we proceed as follows. First, we compare the matching approach with a
proportional hazard approach that both rely on conditional independence. We find that the
estimated treatment effects are very much the same. While training programs and employment
programs have no effect, temporary subsidized jobs have a positive effect on the job finding
rate. Second, the timing-of-events approach allows us to introduce potential selectivity in both
observable characteristics and unobservable characteristics. If we estimate a MMPHmodel which
allows for selection on unobservable characteristics in addition to observable characteristics none
of the treatment effects is positive. So, if unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to influence the
inflow into ALMPs the timing-of-events approach and the matching approach find different
treatment effects.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the Swiss labor market
policy in more detail. In Section 3 we provide specific information on our data set, a weighted
1For a further matching study that also looks at the impact of ALMPs in Switzerland see Prey (2000).
2Gritz (1993) considers the impact of training on the employment experience of American youths and Bonnal
et al. (1997) study the effect of public employment policies set up in France during the 1980’s. Van den Berg et
al. (2002) studies the effects of temporary jobs in the Netherlands and both Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al.
(2005) and Van den Berg et al. (2004) study the effect of benefit sanctions. Two studies closely related to ours
are Richardson and Van den Berg (2001) in which the effect of vocational employment training on the transition
rate from unemployment to work is investigated and Cre´pon et al. (2005) who study the effect of counseling
programs on unemployment duration and recurrence.
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random sample of entrants into unemployment in Switzerland over the four–months period
December 1997 to March 1998. Section 4 discusses the modelling of dynamic treatment effects
in more detail. The results of our analysis are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Labor market policy in Switzerland
In 1997 the Swiss government introduced a reform of unemployment insurance that constituted
a change away from passive income maintenance towards active measures. The new law obliged
the Swiss cantons to supply a minimum number of ALMP-places per year. Economy-wide,
these requirements add up to a stock of 25,000 places. This compares to an average stock of
unemployment of about 188,000 individuals in 1997 and about 140,000 in 1998.
The new law increased maximum benefit entitlement and, at the same time, created a close
link between unemployment benefit entitlement and participation in an active measure. For a
newly unemployed the maximum entitlement period is 104 weeks, up from originally 80 weeks.3
The benefit entitlement period is divided into two different parts. For at most 7 months the
job-seeker can receive unemployment benefits, unconditional upon participation in an active
measure. For the remaining 17 months unemployment benefits are paid only if the unemployed
is willing to participate in a measure.
Employment service staff decides on participation in ALMPs based on subjective evaluation
of the job-seekers employment prospects. Individuals are notified about their participation into
a program one or two weeks in advance. A job seeker is not allowed to refuse participation once
he or she is assigned to participate in an ALMP. Refusal to participate results in withholding of
benefit payments for a period of 1 to 30 days.4
As mentioned by the OECD (1996), the new Swiss unemployment insurance system is an
ambitious one. Compared to other countries the Swiss rules are different in at least two impor-
tant respects. First, the intervention takes place at a rather early stage of the unemployment
spell, after seven months. And secondly, for training courses and employment programs, ben-
efit payments are conditional upon ALMP-participation and this participation does not lead
to a new benefit entitlement. In contrast, temporary subsidized jobs lead to a new benefit
3The above entitlement regulation holds for an individual who has been employed and has contributed to the
insurance system for at least 6 within the last 24 months.
4See Lalive, van Ours and Zweimu¨ller (2005) for an evaluation of the Swiss sanction system.
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entitlement. Note, however, that most individuals enter this program at a rather early stage
of the unemployment spell so it is rather unlikely that individuals use this program to acquire
prolonged unemployment benefits.5 The ALMP-measures can be divided into four categories:
1. Basic Training. The job courses usually last 3 weeks and aim at improving the effectiveness
of individual job search (how to write application letters, how to behave at job talks) and
self-esteem. The computer courses last about 3 weeks and refer to basic word processing
and spreadsheet calculation. The language courses last about 2 months and include reading
and writing skills. Language courses are more likely to be attended by foreigners but also
native Swiss attend these courses frequently.
2. Advanced Training. Vocational training courses last slightly less than two months and
provide vocational training in business administration and related areas. Other courses
last about 2 months and concern a rather heterogeneous group of course types, includ-
ing specific computer training, business administration, technical training, courses in the
tourism and the health sector.
3. Employment programs. These refer to temporary jobs in the non-profit sector, which last
about 5 months. The jobs may be provided by both private sector (NGOs) and public
sector (such as communal offices).
4. Subsidized jobs. These are actual low-wage jobs that firms register with the public employ-
ment service or that firms offer to an unemployed individual. These jobs are considered
to be temporary because the wage in theses jobs is below the official minimum of 67 %
of the previous wage (the “reasonability” limit). The individual is still expected to search
for a new regular job. It is not possible for firms to reduce the wage payment for such a
job in order to benefit from the subsidy.6
Table 1
5The average elapsed duration at entry is less than 3 months, see Table 1 which is discussed in more detail
below.
6An unemployed individual who accepts such a low-wage job gets 70 or 80 % of the difference between the
previous wage and the wage in the subsidized job as a wage supplement by the unemployment insurance. Note
that temporary subsidized jobs are not part of the official ALMP. However, in terms of their set-up and the way
they operate there is no reason to exclude them from the analysis. On the contrary, to analyze the effects of
policy interventions in full detail it is necessary to include temporary subsidized jobs.
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Table 1 presents detailed descriptive statistics on the programs. These statistics, based on
the dataset we describe in more detail in the next section, indicate that in terms of participants
job training and subsidized jobs are the most important programs. Unemployed workers enter
a program after about 3 months of unemployment but the variation is considerable as can be
seen from the standard deviation of the elapsed unemployment duration at program entry.
It is worth noting that various programs also differ in terms of hours spent on the program.
Training courses typically require weekly hours equivalent to a part-time job, whereas the time-
intensity of employment programs are equivalent to a full-time job. Subsidized jobs can be
either full-time or part-time. Individuals are required to search for a regular job while attending
a program. However, job search requirements are reduced for participants in training courses.
One should also note that training courses and employment programs involve costs that go
beyond the payment of individual benefits. While training courses and employment programs
involve considerable direct costs, this is not the case for subsidized jobs. As the wage subsidy
to the temporary jobs amounts to 70 or 80 % of the difference between the previous wage and
the new wage, working in a subsidized job increases an individual’s income. (The wage plus
wage subsidy amounts to more than the unemployment benefit, at most 96 % of the previous
wage). As the unemployment benefit amounts to 70 or 80 % of the previous wage, a subsidized
job is cheaper in terms of transfer payment from the unemployment insurance system to the
individual. As there are no major direct costs, subsidized jobs seem to be a rather cost-effective
program.7
3 Data
The data set from which we drew our sample, covers all unemployment entrants in Switzerland
over the period December 1997 to March 1998 and follows these individuals up to the end of May
1999. These data come from administrative records of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(AVAM- and ASAL-data base). Among the 70,445 workers who started an unemployment spell
during the above period we concentrate our empirical analysis on a subsample of those workers
for whom we could match the information of the AVAM- and ASAL-database with information
from social security records (AHV-data). The latter provide detailed information on individuals’
7A Swiss study conducted by BASS (1999) estimates that, in the absence of the subsidized job program, total
expenditures of the unemployment system as a whole would be 4 percent higher.
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earnings and employment histories over the last 10 years prior to their unemployment spells.
We had only limited access to the social security records. These data available to us contains
a 50 % random sample of the inflow in December 1997, and a 30 % random sample of the inflow
from January 1998 to March 1998. In the analysis in Section 5 we account for this by weighting
each observation by the inverse of the probability of being in the random social security sample.
The sample on which our empirical estimates are based contains 15,073 job seekers.8
Figure 1 shows the transition rates from unemployment to regular jobs and from unemploy-
ment to ALMPs.9 There is a very strong increase in the probability of entering both regular
jobs and ALMPs, from about 5 % per month in the first month of unemployment, up to a level
of almost 15-20 % per month in the third month of unemployment. Thereafter, the transition
rates revert to a level of 5 % per month and remain at that level from month 6 onwards. The
patterns of both transition rates are very similar.10 Thus, the process of finding jobs could be
affected by similar factors as the process of finding a suitable active labor market program.
Figure 1 and Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the monthly empirical hazard rates for transitions from unemployment in
more detail. The direct transition rate to jobs, labelled as “no ALMP” is identical to the one
presented in Figure 1. This baseline exit rate serves to establish the effects of the programs as
we discuss in the following section. Defining tc as the duration until entry into an ALMP we
distinguish three groups, those that enter in the first three months “ALMP: tc < 3”, those that
enter between 3 and 6 months “ALMP: 3 ≤ tc < 6”, and those who enter after 6 months of
unemployment “ALMP: 6 ≤ tc”. Compared to the baseline hazard rate, the exit rate of the
ALMP-participants is lower initially, but tends to be higher than the baseline hazard rate after
a period of at most 4 months. This suggests that capturing the dynamics of the effect of the
ALMP on the hazard rate compared to non-participation may be important.
8We removed all job seekers who were not entitled to unemployment benefits, were re-entering unemployment
within a period of two calendar years, were aged younger than 20 years or older than 49 years, were disabled or
were foreigners with an asylum seeker or seasonal permit.
9The transition rates account for censoring by the Kaplan-Meier method.
10Note that with the exception of the employment programs, the temporal pattern of the separate program
entry rates is qualitatively similar to the overall ALMP entry rate.
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4 Modelling dynamic treatment effects
This section discusses our identification strategy. The logic of our approach is simple. We
first discuss two important considerations that arise when a program is dynamically assigned
to individuals. Second, we propose two estimators that identify the effects of treatments when
treatment assignment is ignorable conditional on the information provided by the data. Whereas
the matching estimator just uses the conditional independence assumption, the hazard estimator
restricts the hazard rate of the outcome process to follow the proportional hazard restriction.
The section finally discusses the possibility that selection is also based on unobservables.
4.1 The start of a treatment
When investigating the effects of ALMPs one has to deal with two questions concerning the
start of the program, i.e. the start of the treatment. The first question is whether unemployed
individuals anticipated the start of a program; the second question is when the potential effects
of the treatment can be expected to occur, right from the start of the program or after the
program has ended.
As Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) indicate in the setting of a timing-of-events analysis
unemployed individuals are not allowed to anticipate the start of the program a long time in
advance. Individuals who anticipate the start of the program may reduce their search intensity
prior to the start. In that case the effects of the program are overestimated. We think that
anticipation is not a problem in the Swiss case. As discussed in Section 2 job seekers are notified
about actual participation only one or two weeks in advance. Therefore, even if they would have
wanted to react they did not have a lot of time to react.11
The relevant starting date of potential ALMP-effects depends on the nature of the program.
In case of training courses, where program duration is established in advance and participants
should follow a particular curriculum, it makes sense to start investigating the effects of the
program after it has finished. Then, as in Richardson and Van den Berg (2001), the length
of time intervals spent in a program is set to zero (i.e. “the calendar time clock is stopped”
while participants are in the program). However, in case of subsidized jobs or employment
11Furthermore, during our observation period, there was a lack of available ALMP slots so individuals could
not anticipate to get into a program eventually (see Lechner and Fro¨lich, 2005). Finally, job seekers were aware of
the fact that they could be penalized if they reduced their search efforts in anticipation of program participation.
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programs, participants are expected to find a regular job as soon as possible and should accept
any suitable job offer. Then, participants can leave the program to take a regular job at any
time and stopping the calendar time clock (i.e. disregarding the interval during which the
individual is in the program) does not make sense. In other words, whether or not one should
investigate the effects on the job finding rate from the start of the program depends on the
nature of the program. Note, however, that in both cases there is a locking-in effect. In case of
a training program the locking-in effect is exogenous in the sense that participants are expected
to finish the program and will not start a new job before the program is finished.12 In case of a
subsidized job or an employment program the locking-in effect is endogenous in the sense that
it is determined by the search behavior of the participant. Therefore, for these programs we
investigate the treatment effects from the moment they start. To compare the treatment effects
across programs we do the same for training courses.
4.2 Selection on observables
4.2.1 Matching estimator
We start our empirical analysis below with a matching estimator that does not restrict the way
in which ALMPs affect the exit rate. The estimator recognizes that program participants and
non-participants may differ in two important respects. First, program participants may be a
selective subset of the population with respect to observables. A meaningful comparison group
is therefore balanced with respect to these variables. The second difference arises due to the
fact that the timing of program participation is a process with a strong stochastic component.13
This implies that control individuals must be drawn from the set of individuals that have neither
left unemployment nor entered treatment at the moment when the treated individual starts
treatment.
In the evaluation, we focus on the effects of the first treatment on the duration of unem-
ployment. More precisely, we estimate the effect of a new training “sequence” on the remaining
duration of unemployment. If such a sequence consists of participating in two or more ALMPs,
information on the occurrence and timing of the second (or third,...) spell is disregarded. The
12Note that Richardson and Van den Berg (2001) find a positive treatment effect of vocational employment
training only if the time spent in these programs is ignored.
13See Fredriksson and Johansson (2003), Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2005), and
Sianesi (2004) for evaluation studies in the random program start setting.
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various programs are indexed by p = 1, ..., 4.14 The transition rate from unemployment to
program p is assumed to have a proportional hazard specification given by
θp(t|x) = λp(t) exp(xβp). (1)
where θp denotes the transition rate from unemployment to a program, t is the elapsed duration
of unemployment, and x is a vector of individual and labor market characteristics that determine
this transition process.15 The baseline hazard rate λp allows for flexible duration dependence
by using a step function
λp(t) = exp(Σkλpk Ik(t)) (2)
where k = 1, .., 5 is a subscript for time-intervals and Ik(t) are time-varying dummy variables
for the following time intervals: 0-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, 9-11 months and 12 and
more months.16
The proposed matching estimator works as follows. In a first step we estimate separate
transition rates to each of the four programs. This gives an estimate of the transition rate of
individual i to each program p: θ̂ip(t) = λ̂p(t) exp(xiβ̂p).
In the second step we select, for each participant i in program p, the “nearest neighbor” in
terms of the transition rate to program p. Note that the transition rate to the program is the
instantaneous propensity score. The set of potential nearest neighbors consists of observations
that are still “at risk” of entering program p as their first program. In other words, these are
observations that have neither entered an ALMP nor accepted a regular job before observation
i entered program p. Let Tu denote the random variable that characterizes the duration of
unemployment until the individual finds a regular job, and let Tp denote the random variable
that characterizes the duration of unemployment until the start of program p.We denote by T˜ the
random variable that characterizes the duration until the individual either finds a regular job or
starts her first treatment, so T˜ = min(Tu, T1, ..., T4). And we denote by t˜ a particular realization
14p = 1 indexes basic training, p = 2 advanced training, p = 3 employment programs and p = 4 subsidized jobs.
15Specifically, these observables are gender, marital status, number of dependents, age, residence permit (applies
to non-Swiss residents), mother tongue, skill level, position in the previous firm, type of job required (in same
industry, part-time), previous industry, previous occupation, previous wage, duration of previous job, recent labor
market history (1995-1997), distant labor market history (1988-1994), inflow period, the unemployment rate in
the canton of residence of the job seeker in the month prior to entering unemployment (time-invariant), proportion
of unemployed in ALMP, voting in a 1997 referendum on benefit cuts, and employability.
16In a sensitivity analysis, we use a very flexible baseline hazard which is allowed to shift every month.
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of T˜ . The set of potential control observations for individual i with T ip = t˜
i (somebody whose
first program is p) is given by Ai ≡ {j|t˜j > t˜i, j 6= i}. The “nearest neighbor” is the observation
j ∈ Ai that minimizes abs(θ̂jp(t˜i)− θ̂ip(t˜i)).17
The final step involves estimating the counterfactual survivor function of the treated obser-
vations by using the information provided by control observations. There are two important
considerations in this step. First control observations may be treated in the future.18 Thus,
for control observations the remaining duration of unemployment is given by min(T ju − T ip, T j1 −
T ip, ..., T
j
4 − T ip), i.e. the time remaining in unemployment without participating in any of the
four programs. The counterfactual survivor function can be recovered from information on this
remaining duration of control observations, treating as right-censored all observations going
to an ALMP. Second, the asymptotic bias may dominate the asymptotic variance in nearest-
neighbor matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). This problem can be addressed by estimating
the counterfactual transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs conditional on the ob-
served characteristics of the matched controls. This estimate of the counterfactual transition
rate can then be used to simulate the counterfactual survivor function for the treated population
using the observed characteristics of the treated.
The central identifying assumption that justifies the matching estimator is that conditional
on observed characteristics of the individuals assignment to program p is independent of the
potential remaining duration without the program. This conditional independence assumption
has been justified by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) by the fact that the Swiss unemployment
insurance register is extremely rich in terms of observed characteristics. In particular, the
data contain information on employability, a subjective caseworker assessment of the likely
labor market prospects of the job seeker filled out at the start of the unemployment spell.19
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) show that when the conditional independence assumption
holds, the effect of treatment on the treated can be identified by contrasting the outcomes of
individuals who are treated at t˜ to individuals who have not been treated until t˜ who have the
17Similar to Sianesi (2004) we impose a caliper of .01 in determining the nearest neighbor.
18This has led to focusing on the effect of “being treated now vs. being treated in the future” (Fredriksson and
Johansson, 2003; Sianesi, 2004).
19In addition, we use information on gender, marital status, number of dependents, age, residence permit
(applies to non-Swiss residents), mother tongue, skill level, position in the previous firm, type of job required
(in same industry, part-time), previous industry, previous occupation, previous wage, duration of previous job,
recent labor market history (1995-1997), distant labor market history (1988-1994), inflow period, unemployment
rate, proportion of unemployed in ALMP, voting in a 1997 referendum on benefit cuts to control for differences
in labor market prospects between ALMP participants and non-participants.
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same propensity to enter treatment at time t˜. Note that the propensity to enter treatment at
time t˜ is identical to the ALMP entry hazard rate θp(t˜|x).
4.2.2 Proportional hazard model
Alternatively, we use a proportional hazard model to identify the treatment effects of the various
programs. Let
Dp(t) = I[t > t˜ ∪ t˜ = Tp] (3)
be the indicator function that, after elapsed duration t, the individual has already entered his
or her first program and that this is program p. This defines 4 treatment indicators D1, ..., D4,
one for each program.
Note that because we analyze the treatment effects of the four programs separately, it is
essential to censor unemployment spells for job seekers leaving unemployment for a program
that is not being studied. For instance, when studying basic training the unemployment spell
is recorded as right censored for all job seekers who enter advanced training, employment pro-
grams, or subsidized jobs at the time when they enter those programs. The proportional hazard
estimator postulates that the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs is
θu(t|x,Dp(t)) = λu(t) exp(xβu + δp(t, t˜)Dp(t)). (4)
where θu(t|·) is the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job at elapsed duration of
unemployment t conditional on individual characteristics x and the treatment indicator Dp(t).
The treatment effects are specified as δp(t, t˜) = ΣkδpkIk(t− t˜) where the δpk are parameters to be
estimated, and Ik(t− t˜) are dummy variables that vary with time since start of treatment t− t˜
for the intervals 0-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, and 9 months and longer. The baseline
hazard λu(t) is again allowed to vary with the elapsed duration of unemployment in the same
way as the program entry hazard rate. In separate estimates, the model estimates 4 treatment
effect vectors δp, one for each program. We keep the specification flexible and allow treatment
effects to vary over time.
The proportional hazard estimator identifies the effect of ALMPs on the duration of unem-
ployment under two conditions. First, it assumes that conditional on observables x, participation
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in the ALMP is not informative on unemployment duration without the program, i.e. that se-
lection is based on observables. This is the assumption that is also required for the matching
estimator. In addition, the proportional hazard estimator imposes a particular functional form
on the hazard rate. The assumption is that the characteristics x of the individuals shift the
hazard rate in a proportional manner irrespective of the time elapsed since the start of the spell.
4.2.3 Comparing the two methods
The focus of our evaluation is the causal effect of treatment p on the remaining duration of
unemployment after the start of the program. Remaining duration of unemployment is given
by T pr ≡ T pu − T˜ , where T pu is total duration of unemployment with program p, and T˜ is the
duration of unemployment until the first program starts. The counterfactual is Tr ≡ Tu − T˜ ,
that is, the remaining duration of unemployment without the program.
We compare the results of the matching estimator and the proportional hazard estimator
with respect to the effect of treatment p on those treated with program p, i.e. E(T pr −Tr|T˜ = Tp).
The effect of treatment on the treated is useful in assessing whether program p has achieved the
goal to foster re-entry of job seekers into regular jobs. Note, however, that the effect of program
p should not be compared to the effect of program p′ because the program p applies to a different
subpopulation than the effect of program p′. An alternative parameter is the average effect of
treatment, that is, the effect of treatment on the average job seeker. This parameter is useful
in discussing the issue of whether the program should be extended to the entire population of
job seekers. We focus on the effect of treatment on the treated because this parameter is crucial
in the ex post evaluation of the question whether active labor market programs are helpful in
placing job seekers that were affected by the programs into jobs.
Since both T pr and Tr are positive random variables, the effect of treatment on the treated
can be represented as follows
E(T pr − Tr|T˜ = Tp) =
∫ ∞
0
(Spr (t|T˜ = Tp)− Sr(t|T˜ = Tp))dt (5)
where Spr (t|T˜ = Tp) is the survivor function of remaining duration with treatment p, i.e. Spr (t|T˜ =
Tp) = 1 − Pr(T pr > t|T˜ = Tp), and Sr(t|T˜ = Tp) is the survivor function of the counterfactual
remaining duration without treatment p. Note that right-censoring of the remaining duration of
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unemployment implies that the effect of treatment on the treated can not be recovered from the
data. Instead, we base our comparison of the results on the difference in the survivor function
with treatment and the counterfactual survivor function without treatment in the first 12 months
after the start of the treatment.20
The matching estimator provides a matched set of treated and control observations. We
estimate the unconditional (with respect to x) survivor function with treatment and the un-
conditional counterfactual survivor function in three steps. First, we estimate the conditional
hazard of leaving unemployment for regular jobs using maximum likelihood. Note that we es-
timate the conditional counterfactual hazard of leaving unemployment without treatment using
the matched control sample. In the second step, we use the resulting estimates to simulate both
the conditional survivor function with treatment Spr (t|x, T˜ = Tp), and the conditional counterfac-
tual survivor function without treatment Sr(t|x, T˜ = Tp) for each person in treatment p. In the
third step, we average the conditional survivor functions to estimate the unconditional survivor
function with treatment Spr (t|T˜ = Tp) ≡ E[Spr (t|x, T˜ = Tp)|Dp = 1], and the unconditional coun-
terfactual survivor function without treatment Sr(t|T˜ = Tp) ≡ E[Sr(t|x, T˜ = Tp)|Dp = 1]. This
three step procedure addresses the problem that nearest neighbor propensity score matching
methods may be inconsistent (Abadie and Imbens, 2002).
The proportional hazard estimator gives the conditional (on observables x and program en-
try times t˜) remaining duration survivor function with treatment Ŝpr (t|x, t˜) = exp(−
∫ t
0 θ̂u(t˜ +
z|x,Dp(t˜ + z))dz).21 The conditional survivor function without treatment is obtained by im-
posing non-participation, i.e. Dp(t˜+ z) = 0 everywhere. The unconditional survivor curves are
obtained by taking the average with respect of the distribution of x and program entry times t˜
in the treated population of the corresponding conditional survivor functions.22
The comparison of the two estimators is based on the difference in the unconditional survivor
20Note that the integral with respect to time since start of this difference gives the “effect of treatment on
the treated in the first 12 months after start.” We restrict attention to the first 12 months after start due to
right censoring. Since the average time until the first program starts is between 3 and 4 months and since the
observation window covers at least 14 months (for those entering end of March 1998), censoring is unlikely to
affect the results regarding the first 12 months after the start of the program.
21Note that Dp(t˜+ z) = 1 since t˜ is the date of program entry.
22A second alternative to using bootstrap standard errors is use the asymptotic distribution of the proportional
hazard model parameters to calculate the asymptotic standard errors of the treatment effect in the proportional
hazard model. This strategy tends to give smaller standard errors because the parametric model is more efficient.
Nevertheless, we find that our main conclusions regarding the comparison between the matching estimator and
the proportional hazard estimator are robust to using standard errors due to the proportional hazard model.
15
curves.23 This difference should be negligible if (i) the unemployment exit rate indeed has a
proportional structure, and (ii) the proportional hazard model is sufficiently flexible to capture
treatment effect heterogeneity and the dynamics of the treatment effect. Note that even if the
empirical results suggest that the difference in the matching and proportional hazard estimates
is not statistically different from zero it does not necessarily follow that the proportionality
restriction is valid. It appears possible to construct examples where proportionality is violated
but the semi-parametric matching method and the proportional hazard estimator nevertheless
provide similar estimates. We nevertheless believe that it is instructive to perform this analysis
because it documents how strongly the important proportionality assumption is affecting results.
Inference is based on the variability of the difference between the effect of treatment on the
treated survivor curve according to matching and the effect of treatment on the treated survivor
curve according to the proportional hazard model in 250 sub-samples of the original dataset.
While the asymptotic distribution of the proportional hazard estimator are well understood, we
are not aware of asymptotic results for propensity score matching estimators that account for
variability of the first stage (see the survey by Imbens 2004). Note that bootstrapping leads
to biased inference on the asymptotic variance of the matching estimator (Abadie and Imbens,
2004). We therefore use subsampling. Politis and Romano (1994) show that subsampling works if
the sampling distribution of the difference in survivor curves converges weakly to the underlying
population distribution and the ratio between the sub-sample size b and the sample size n
converges to zero as n tends to ∞. Theoretical considerations regarding the choice of b are
difficult and beyond the scope of this paper. In this application, we choose b so large that the
probability is high that all models can be calculated in subsamples.24
4.3 Allowing for selection on unobservables
The third estimator relies strongly on the assumption of proportionality but it relaxes the
assumption of conditional independence. Specifically, this estimator is based on the following
mixed proportional hazard specification for the transition rate unemployment to a regular job
θu(t|x,Dp(t), vu) = λu(t) exp(xβu + δp(t, t˜)Dp(t))vu. (6)
23Note that in performing this comparison, we restrict attention to the set of participants in program p, for
whom we can find a “nearest neighbor” according to the matching protocol.
24Specifically, we fix b = int(n99/100) which is b = 13, 690.
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The term vu captures heterogeneity that is unobserved to the researcher and is allowed to be
correlated with corresponding heterogeneity terms vp in the transition rate from unemployment
to program p, and and vc in the process that characterizes endogenous right censoring when job
seekers exit unemployment for other active labor market programs. The model for the transition
rate from unemployment to program p is
θp(t|x, vp) = λp(t) exp(xβp)vp, (7)
and the model for entry into other programs – the endogenous right censoring process – is
θc(t|x, vc) = λc(t) exp(xβc)vc, (8)
and the unknown joint distribution of the heterogeneity terms is denoted by G(vu, vp, vc).
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a) prove that the model consisting of (6) and (7) is identified.
Because entry into other active labor market programs is likely to be endogenous, we add the
third censoring process (8) to the basic ‘timing-of-events’ model. The treatment effect in this
extended MMPH model is identified. The identification proof in Abbring and Van den Berg
(2003a, p. 550) has two parts. The first part notes that a model that censors the outcome
process at the time of entry into program p is a basic and well-understood competing risks
model with unobserved heterogeneity. This model is identified regardless of the number of
processes (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b). The second part of the proof shows that the
treatment effect is identified. This result does not depend on the number of competing risks
process in the MMPH model. It follows that the model consisting of the processes (6), (7), and
(8) is identified.25
Estimating the model requires specification of the joint distribution of the heterogeneity
terms G(vu, vp, vc). We follow the standard approach in the literature of approximating the
unknown joint distribution by means of a discrete distribution using non-parametric maximum
likelihood (NPMLE). We assume G to be a multivariate discrete distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. Work by Heckman and Singer (1984) suggests that discrete distributions can
approximate any arbitrary distribution function G. We assume that each transition rate has
25We thank Gerard van den Berg for pointing this out to us.
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two points of support – (vu,a, vu,b), (vp,a, vp,b), (vc,a, vc,b) – so the joint distribution therefore has
eight points of support.
The MMPH model relaxes the assumption of conditional independence of the potential
durations from program participation status. Note, however, that this generality comes at a cost.
First, it is necessary to specify a functional form in which heterogeneity enters the hazard rate.26
Second, in single spell data, we have to assume that unobserved heterogeneity is independent
of the observables x. Third, as with the PH estimator, the assumption of proportionality needs
to hold. If these restrictions hold, a comparison between the PH and the MMPH estimator
allows investigating the extent to which the assumption of “selection on observables” affects the
estimated effect of ALMPs on unemployment duration.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Accounting for selection on observables
We present results of the matching estimator in Figure 3. The vertical axis measures the
differences between the survivor function of the treated and the counterfactual survivor function
estimated from matched control observations. For basic training and for employment programs,
this difference is positive over almost the complete year after the program start. Even one
year after program has started the difference is close to zero or even slightly positive. Taken
together this means that basic training and employment programs prolong the duration of
unemployment. Both advanced training and subsidized jobs also tend to prolong unemployment
initially during the first 4 months (subsidized job) to 6 months (advanced training) probably due
to a locking-in effect. As time passes, however, there is a clear negative difference between the
survivor function with treatment compared to the counterfactual. This difference is statistically
significant 6 months after a subsidized job has started. The difference remains insignificant for
advanced training throughout the first year after the program started. This suggests that in the
medium to long run advanced training and subsidized jobs can lead to a reduction in average
unemployment duration.
Figure 3
26Note that the above specification is more restrictive, however, than some of the models discussed in Abbring
and van den Berg (2003). For instance, the treatment effect is allowed to vary with respect to observables and
unobservables in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003).
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The results presented in Figure 3 can be compared to the results in Gerfin and Lechner
(2002) and Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2003). In these papers, the difference in the survivor
curves are also increasing at early durations reaching a maximum after 3 to 5 months after the
program started and then start to decline. In quantitative amount the effects are somewhat
different, though. This may be due to two reasons. First, our sample differs from the one used
in Gerfin and Lechner (2002). The latter use a stock sample, whereas our sample is an inflow
sample. Second, our control group consists of individuals that are not yet treated but may
be treated at a later stage of the unemployment spell (in which case the information on the
remaining duration after program start is taken as censored). In Gerfin and Lechner (2002)
the control group consists only of individuals that are never treated. Note, however, that in
qualitative terms the dynamic patterns of the treatment effect is very similar. We observe
an increase in the difference in survivor rates between treatment and control group at early
remaining durations, and the opposite pattern at later durations. Moreover, also in Gerfin and
Lechner (2002) subsidized jobs seem to be quite successful.
The second estimator that can be used to identify the causal effects when selection into the
programs is based on observables is the proportional hazard estimator. Table 2 shows how the
four programs affect the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs as a function of time
elapsed since the program started. There is a significant reduction in the transition rate from
unemployment to regular jobs in the first 3 months (0 to 2 months) after the program started for
all programs except for the subsidized jobs. This ”locking-in-effect” is strongest for employment
programs implying a reduction of the hazard rate by 53 % (= 100(exp(−.765)−1). The training
programs are characterized by somewhat weaker ”locking-in-effects” on the order of 19 % for
basic training and 24 % for advanced training. Exits from unemployment to regular jobs are,
however, already slightly higher for the treated compared to the counterfactual situation 3 to
5 months after the program starts for all programs except for basic training programs. The
improvement in the hazard rate is, however, only significant for subsidized jobs. During 6 to 8
after their start, all Swiss active labor market programs are shown to improve the job chances of
participating job seekers. Only for basic training, the positive effect is not significantly different
from zero. When 9 and more months have elapsed all programs significantly improve job chances
of job seekers.
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It is interesting to know whether the initial negative effect of most of the programs is more
than compensated later on, i.e. whether the net program effect is positive. One way to investi-
gate the net program effect in the context of a proportional hazard model is to use time-invariant
treatment effects (Panel B in Table 2). Proportional hazard models with a time-invariant treat-
ment effect indicate that the net effect is significantly negative for basic training and employment
programs. The net effect point estimate is positive but not significantly different from zero for
advanced training. Subsidized jobs are the only program with a statistically significantly posi-
tive effect on exits from unemployment to regular jobs. The results concerning the subsidized
jobs imply that on average these jobs increase the regular job finding rate with 9.4%.
Table 2
Figure 4 compares the results due to the matching estimator with the result due to the
proportional hazard estimator. This comparison is important. The matching estimator is just
identified if selection into treatment is conditionally independent of potential outcomes. The
proportional hazard estimator also requires exogenous participation but, in addition, also im-
poses a proportional structure on the unemployment exit rate. A comparison of matching results
and proportional hazard results thus assesses the robustness of our findings to the imposing pro-
portionality of the hazard rate. Figure 4 reports the difference in the causal effect according to
the proportional hazard estimator and the causal effect according to the matching estimator.
A positive number thus indicates that the proportional hazard estimator is more pessimistic
regarding the effects of Swiss active labor market programs on unemployment duration. Figure
4 also reports the 95 % confidence interval on the difference in causal effects estimated by sub-
sampling (see section 4). Figure 4 shows that the results for the proportional hazard estimator
are basically identical to the results for the matching estimator in a statistical sense. There is
no statistically significant divergence of results for any of the four programs considered. Figure
4 thus shows that if conditional independence is valid, the results are not sensitive to imposing
a proportional structure on the hazard rate.27
Figure 4
27Note that this does not imply that the proportional structure is correct. It merely implies that the proportional
structure does not bias results in a statistically significant way. Moreover, Figure 4 also does not allow investigating
whether assuming proportionality for observed and unobserved characteristics biases results.
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5.2 Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity
We study the treatment effects of the programs in more detail by introducing unobserved hetero-
geneity into the analysis and estimate MMPH models. Table 3 reports the estimated treatment
effects
Table 3
As shown, in each of the estimated models unobserved heterogeneity is identified although
the number of masspoints depends on the program investigated. For instance, there are four
masspoints for basic training. Conditional on observed characteristics and elapsed duration
there is a group of unemployed individuals consisting of 93.0% of the sample that have a high
exit rate to a regular job, a high exit rate to a course and a high exit rate to other programs
– the censoring rate. The other groups of 3.3%, 1.8% and 1.9 % have different combinations of
transitions rates but the shear size of the first group implies that there is a positive correlation
between the unobserved components of the job finding rate and the transition rate to courses.
There could be several reasons for such a positive correlation. It could result from the incentives
of caseworkers. In order to have a favorable placement record, caseworkers may send those
unemployed with the highest chances of getting a regular job into basic training. It could also
be the case that individuals with the better chances to get a regular job are better motivated to
do a course for some intermediate period.
The number of mass points identified ranges from three in the model with advanced training
to six in the model with employment programs while in the case of the model with subsidized
jobs three mass points are identified. For each of the models there is a predominant positive
correlation between the exit rate to regular jobs and the exit rate to the particular program.
If these positive correlations are not accounted for, the treatment effects will be overestimated.
Indeed, as shown in Table 3, once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity the treatment effects
of all programs are either negative or not statistically different from zero.
Panel B in Table 3 reports the net effect of these programs on exits from unemployment to
regular jobs. This net effect is significantly negative for basic training, advanced training, and
employment programs. The net effect is not statistically different from zero for subsidized jobs.
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To investigate the robustness of our results we perform a variety of sensitivity analyses, one
of which is shown in Table 4.28 Recall that the main result for the jobs was obtained in a
trivariate MPH model that allows for a shift in the baseline hazard rate after 3, 6, 9, and 12
months respectively. Table 4 shows that the relevant parameter estimates of trivariate MPH
models that allow for a shift in the baseline hazard rate after every month, i.e. after 1, 2, ...,
17 months. Results for the model with a flexible specification of the baseline hazard are similar
to the baseline results. Changing the specification of the baseline hazard does not affect the
estimates of the underlying heterogeneity distribution. Moreover, the flexible baseline hazard
model also indicates that the treatment effects are negative or not statistically significant from
zero.
Table 4
Table 5 allows for a time-of-entry effect in the causal effect of training programs.29 From a
statistical point of view it may be that unobserved heterogeneity is capturing functional form
misspecification in the baseline model. Suppose that program effects vary with time of entry in
the sense that the causal effect of a program is worse when individuals enter the program late
in the unemployment spell. Neglecting such a time-of-entry effect then might lead to wrongly
identifying unobserved heterogeneity because there is a group of job seekers (entering late) with
low exit rates and low program entry rates and another group of job seekers (entering early) with
a high exit rate and a high program entry rate. It is therefore important to assess the sensitivity
of our results to allowing for time-of-entry effects. Table 5 shows that time-of-entry effects matter
for all programs except for the advanced training courses. The results indicate that programs
work better when job seekers enter early rather than late. For instance, entering a program
one month later is shown to decrease the effect of basic training program 5.5 percentage points
(= 100(exp(−.057) − 1)). Nevertheless, the main conclusion from the baseline model remains
unaffected. All Swiss active labor market programs either decrease the exits from unemployment
28In addition to this we estimated MMPH models for sub-programs. We did separate estimates for job courses,
language courses, computer courses, further vocational training, other courses, public employment programs, and
private employment programs. This did not change our main conclusions. As an alternative to the discrete
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity we tried using a multivariate log normal distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. However, we were unable to find any improvement in the log likelihood compared to the model
that does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Apparently the multivariate log normal specification is too
restrictive.
29We are grateful to a referee for raising this issue.
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to regular jobs or their effects are not significantly different from zero because there appears
to be genuine unobserved heterogeneity in exits to regular jobs, entry into the program that is
being studied, and entry into other programs (endogenous right-censoring).
Table 5
6 Conclusions
This paper discusses the effect of ALMPs on the duration of unemployment in a dynamic evalu-
ation context. In the empirical analysis we discuss in detail to what extent the functional form
assumption of the proportional hazard model and the assumption of conditional independence
may affect the evaluation results.
The empirical results of our paper come in three parts. First, we use a matching method
presenting the treatment effect results in the form of graphs. Though the set-up of the matching
estimator is different from the one in previous studies on the effectiveness of Swiss labor market
policies the results are very much the same. Second, we use a proportional hazard model with
time-varying treatment effects. Both approaches lead to the same conclusion that the program of
subsidized jobs is the most promising program in terms of their positive effects on the transition
rate from unemployment to regular jobs. Third, we estimate a bivariate MPH-model where
regular jobs and ALMPs are competing destinations. In the context of this model the treatment
effect can be estimated accounting for selectivity both due to observed and due to unobserved
characteristics. We conclude that after allowing for selectivity even the treatment effect of
subsidized jobs fades away. The reason is that the unobserved characteristics in the job finding
rate and the program entrance rate are positively correlated.
From a research point of view our main result is that the matching approach and the timing-
of-events approach generates different treatment effects once we allow unobserved heterogeneity
to influence the inflow into ALMPs. It is difficult to compare both methods directly as neither
of them has a clear economic interpretation and the identifying assumptions are not nested. The
method of matching is based on the conditional independence assumption, i.e. the assumption
that potential outcomes and selection into programs are independent conditional on the observ-
ables. If this assumption is valid, the method of matching is to be preferred to other methods
since it is just-identified. In the timing-of-events approach it is possible to relax this assumption
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and allow unobserved heterogeneity to affect the selection process. However this comes at a
cost since it requires assumptions with respect to functional form and independence between
unobservables and observables.
From a policy point of view our main result is that the introduction of unobserved hetero-
geneity substantially affects the estimated treatment effect. This implies that further and more
detailed information regarding how job seekers are selected into programs is crucial before policy
recommendations can be made.
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Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment register data.
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Figure 2:
Transition rate to regular jobs, by treatment status
tc refers to duration until entry. The average duration until entry is 1.7, 4.1, and 9.3 
months for the three groups, respectively. no ALMP refers to the transition rate to jobs 
treating exits to ALMP as censored.
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The Effects of Active Labor Market Programs 
Matching Estimator
Figure 3:
S1 is the survivor curve with treatment, S0 is the counterfactual survivor curve without 
treatment for the treated. Dashes lines represent 95% confidence interval based on 250 sub-
samples.
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Figure 4:
Comparing the Results of Two Estimators that Use Conditional Independence
Proportional Hazard Estimator (PH) vs. Matching Estimator (Match)
PH-Match is the difference in the effect (S1-S0) according to the PH estimator and the 
matching estimator. Dashes lines represent 95% confidence interval based on 250 sub-
samples.
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